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STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

THE STRATEGIC IMPLEMENTATION AND EMPLOYMENT OF NON-GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATIONS IN CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS

BY

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ABSTRACT

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The Strategic Implementation and Employment of Non-Government Organizations in

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The purpose of this research project is to develop a strategic plan for the coordination of, and implementation of, religious and Multinational Non-Government Organizations (NGOs) in humanitarian assistance operations. Since the conception of the United Nations in 1945 the number of NGOs has increased from 45 to over 1,500. With the rise of humanitarian missions by developing nations the United States military has taken on the responsibility of protection in theaters of operations. The military has access to resources that are used for the completion of the humanitarian mission. NGOs are often in theater long before the military, but rely on the military forces for supplies. The relationship between the military and NGOs has not always been good. There are ways that the two actors can work together in harmony. Many times the problem arises not on the part of the military only, but through perceptions held by the NGO. This paper will look into the relationship of the military with two large religious based NGOs. A further consideration is given to the role of the chaplain, a role that is still developing, and how religious military professionals can assist in improving relations. This paper will discuss how best for the military and the NGOs to work in theater for successful completion of the mission.

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PREFACE

As an Army Chaplain, and especially as a Roman Catholic Priest, I have been involved in many complex humanitarian operations. As a military chaplain I have been limited to ministering only to military personnel. This I feel is an ineffectual use of manpower and resources.

I have felt that I could have accomplished far more in the theater of operations if I was not under a restraint to minister only to the soldiers, but to contribute to an overall understanding of the problem in the theater. This paper studies the relations of the NGOs and the military as they work closely in complex contingency and humanitarian operations, and envisions what can be done to better the relationship between two very important actors in the theaters of operation.

Many people who have assisted me in the completion of this paper by allowing me to "pick their brains" and to learn from them. I wish to thank Fr John Gannet, Communication Director of Catholic Relief Services, Mr. Jered Hoffman, Director of the Caribbean and Latin American Ministry Programs, Dr Dayton Maxwell, Professor of Latin American Studies at George Mason University and former director of Caribbean Ministry at World Vision International, The Most Reverend Edwin B. Broderick, Tenth Bishop of Albany N.Y. and former Executive Director Of Catholic Relief Services for their help in completion of this paper. This paper is in no means definitive, but is a basis as to how the Chaplaincy can best serve the people of God.

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THE STRATEGIC IMPLEMENTATION AND EMPLOYMENT OF NON-GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATIONS IN CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS

This paper attempts to provide a solution to the unending problem of the working relationship between the United States Military and Non-Government Organizations (NGOs) in humanitarian assistance (HA) operations. This paper will examine the background of the military-NGO relationship, and will explore the relationship, positive and negative, between the military and two religious NGOs: Catholic Relief Services, and World Vision International. This paper will also explore the relationship of the military chaplain with the NGOs. Finally, it will provide conclusions and recommendations for harmonious interlocking efforts between the military and the civilian humanitarian assistance organizations.

The past ten years has seen a tremendous growth in the number of humanitarian operations. This growth has been so large, and at times so overwhelming, that it has compelled world leaders to address this need both with military and material aid. During this same time period there has been an equally large growth in the numbers of NGOs. It is estimated that 35,000 NGOs exist worldwide with "1,500 recognized by the United Nations Economic and Security Council. NGOs are seen as parties that are consulted on policy and program matters and seen as a vital link to society."

WHY HAVE AN NGO-MILITARY RELATIONSHIP

With the end of the Cold War and the rise in the number of missions, the United States military has increasingly been called upon to assist in humanitarian aid. Although not always the best national instrument of choice, "the military has been the tool to address several of these humanitarian missions since 1989." Often times there is a real need for the military to intervene. The troubled areas are frequently remote, often times, hostile environments where chaotic conditions have so complicated relief efforts by NGOs that people die due to supplies being stolen before they arrive. The NGOs need the military for protection, but for mission accomplishment, the military also relies upon the NGOs.

The intervention of military forces is perpetuated by one of three occurrences. One is a natural disaster such as a typhoon, hurricane or earthquake that is so devastating that it cripples the infrastructure of the nation and overwhelms local government. A good example of this is the United States military intervention in Honduras in the aftermath of Hurricane Mitch. A second reason for the intervention of the military would be the lessening of manmade hostilities allowing for the return to a normalcy of government. A prime example of this is post war reconstruction in Bosnia. A third instance requiring military interventions is a rise in hostilities that causes local government to lose control due to a rapid rise in violence.³

Humanitarian Aid is not an unstated mission; rather it is clearly spelled out in the National Security Strategy. "Our efforts to promote democracy and human rights are completed by the humanitarian assistance programs which are designed to alleviate human suffering, help establish democratic regimes that respect human rights and pursue appropriate strategies for economic development."

It is the policy of the United States government that the military will be involved in humanitarian missions. To achieve this mission the military relies heavily on NGOs. It is obvious that they must find a way to work together. As with any situation involving different groups of organizations working for a common purpose preconceived prejudices arise. Both the military and the NGOs are in theater to complete the same mission, but they have very different backgrounds and very different ways in which they accomplish the missions.

In most cases the NGOs have been in theater and on the ground long before the military is even alerted to deploy. "Many humanitarian NGOs have a commitment to long termed [sic] projects in support of economic and social developments. NGOs can sometimes identify the status of conflicts early, provide warning indicators and make reports available to governments, the United Nations (UN) and the media." The NGOs have built a rapport with the people native to the theater, and know what is needed. The NGOs will also be around the theater long after the military re-deploys.

NGOs accomplish many missions in the theater, and act as a buffer between the people and the warring factions. "Another factor encouraging NGOs involvement in peacekeeping operations is the fact that governments, [sic] or warring factions are more likely to welcome their (NGOs) input than other institutional actors." According to Fr. John Ganey, of Catholic Relief Services, the NGOs are always happy to see the military arrive, but the military often times takes over entirely. The idea that the military is armed in a humanitarian mission does not create a spirit of camaraderie. In fact, the weapons sometimes frighten people away. The military requires time to aquatint itself with the people so a spirit of trust can be established. After the military deploys into an area where there has been military oppression, time is required for the people to learn to know and trust the soldiers. Armaments will only frighten individuals away and not allow them the freedom to seek the assistance that they need. What is truly needed is a spirit of reconciliation. When the military and the NGOs work in unison to accomplish the mission and reunite warring factions, the mission is more effectively completed. The best thing for the military is to go slowly and to continue to work with the well-established NGOs to create better conditions for the indigenous personnel.

RELATIONSHIPS OF NGOS AND THE MILITARY

Dr. Dayton Maxwell, senior fellow at George Mason University, and advisor on Complex Missions to World Vision International stated in a 17 December 1999 telephone interview that the best thing that the NGOs can do is to cooperate and work with the military. The military is there to protect them. According to Dr. Maxwell without the military the NGOs could not move about the theater safely, and the military would become mired in issues that could best be handled by a trained agency. For the NGOs to accomplish their mission and to care for the people military presence is paramount; without the NGO's presence the military cannot properly care for the indigenous people. Without each other, little is accomplished.

In the theater the military provides rapid response capabilities, security, logistic management and transportation. The NGOs often work in areas where there is little or no organization. The military enters the theater and provides services for the NGOs, enhancing the NGO's ability to accomplish their defined mission. This is what should be done. But unfortunately stereotypes often get in the way on both the parts of the NGOs and the military. The military is seen by the NGOs as the hard-nosed non-people oriented organization while the military views the NGOs as the altruistic liberals with no use for organization. This may create animosity and, sometimes, long termed bad feelings.

Mr. Jerod Hoffman, Director of Caribbean and Latin American Ministries for Catholic Relief Services (CRS), stated the military was "vital in establishing structure for assistance in Operation Hurricane Mitch, but often times wanted to do it their own way. Mr. Hoffman relayed a story of two Blackhawk helicopters that were loaded with foodstuffs and assistance for a remote village that had been devastated in the hurricane. The problem arose when the pilot would not take off because the commanding general of Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) requested to be present when the aircraft took off. The NGO was frustrated because the food was needed at the village immediately. The NGO could see no reason to stand on protocol when there were hungry people that needed to be fed. In retrospect, Mr. Hoffman admitted that if the commanding general had been informed of the urgency of the mission, he would have told the helicopters to fly without his being there. The pilot was a junior officer following the orders given him by a superior.

Politics rears its head too often in humanitarian assistance missions. However, NGOs are not without their own political faults. They must be seen in theater to get any type of funding from private sources. Receiving press coverage in theater is directly linked to outside funding; five minutes on CNN is worth \$50,000. For NGOs "... projects rely on funding, organizations and resources. They can all be tied to media coverage of a complex humanitarian mission."

The Joint Forces Commander (JFC) must use the NGOs to assist in the accomplishment of the military mission. The JFC must refrain from working at cross-purposes. "All players must work towards a consensus that achieves unity of effort towards everyone's interest." The military and the NGOs are professionals who dedicate their lives to service under less than optimum conditions. Both face budget constraints and both have the needs of mission accomplishment foremost in mind. An NGO representative once commented that the "can do attitude of both the military and the NGOs, a commonality of two seemingly different groups is responsible for the successful positive working relationship in humanitarian assistance operations."

With the growing number of NGOs, many seeking to enter the theater and wave their organization's flags, the question of multiplicity of effort arises. The question as to who is the best qualified and resourced to accomplish the mission must be asked. Opening the gates to all NGOs will do little more than flood the theater with helping organizations and make the decision making process more difficult and frustrating. It must be realized that "no one can relegate NGOs to advisory or advocacy roles. They are part of the decision making process. They make the impossible possible by doing what the

government can't do"¹¹ The challenge is of determining who will receive resourcing is an important issue and may be a problem for the JFC commander; it is an issue that must be addressed.

OPTIONS AND MECHANISMS IN PLACE

Currently there are two options, or mechanisms, in place that could assist the JTF commander in a harmonious working relationship with NGOs. The first option is The Political Military Plan for Complex Humanitarian Operation addressed in Presidential Decision Directive 56 (PDD 56), and the second is the Civilian Military Operating Center.

PRESIDENTIAL DECISION DIRECTIVE 56

Presidential Decision Directive 56, The Clinton Administration's policy on Managing Complex Contingency Operations was written in May 1997. Its intended use is as a guide to government agencies involved in humanitarian operations. With the rise in the number of territorial disputes, armed ethnic conflicts and civil wars that pose threats to American regional security, many agencies were involved in mission accomplishment. Humanitarian operations often times require "multi-dimensional operations composed of such components as political/diplomatic, humanitarian, intelligence, economic developments, and security." ¹²

PDD 56 could easily be adapted to fulfill the mission of integrating the military and NGOs.

While agencies of the government have developed independent capabilities to respond to complex emergencies, military and civilian agencies should operate in a synchronized manner that through interagency management and the use of special mechanisms to coordinate agency efforts. This could expand involvement and create unity of effort that is essential for success. ¹³

PDD 56 tells all agencies to look carefully at their mission and what is needed to make those missions successful.

It is essential that the necessary resources be provided to ensure that we are prepared to respond in an effective and robust manner. To foster a durable peace or stability on these situations and to maximize the efforts of judicious military deployments the civilian components of the operation must be integrated closely with the military components.¹⁴

In every mission, the military goes to great lengths to determine "lessons learned" and is very much involved in the formulation of after action reports (AARs). The implementation of PDD 56 and the suggested changes to accommodate NGOs are no different. If involved in the operation in the theater the NGO must have an active role both in the planning and in evaluating successful and unsuccessful aspects of the operation. The input of the NGOs involved is vital in planning for future operations. It is necessary to have dedicated mechanisms and integrated planning processes in place. The directive states that the AAR allows the government agencies to take proper steps for planning for future operations. The mission must be integrated so that all players have a role in the planning. The right agency must be in the right position in the right situation. A combined planning effort would alleviate the

problem of the duplication of effort on both the parts of government and NGOs. NGOs involvement in the AARs allows for the acceleration of planning and the proper use of NGO's assets such as personnel, and mission capabilities. This planning allows for a tailored force for both the military and the NGOs. The NGOs that possessed assets or resources needed to accomplish the mission, such as medical, and developmental could be encouraged to enter the theater for the mission. Prior experience with a similar mission would allow the agency with the best people in that field to arrive in theater set up their operation and accomplish the task much more quickly. A tailored force with the correct assets both in manning and resources are also fiscally sound thereby alleviating further strain on organizational budgets.

There are two weaknesses in this plan of common control and a tight working relationship of NGOs and military. If this plan is followed it would require NGOs to conform to some governmental regulations. "All agencies, governmental, [sic] are required to review their legislative and budget authorization for supporting complex contingency operations." This disclosure would require the NGOs to review their own financial backing. Are they fiscally responsible enough to enter this particular theater of operation and stay until the mission is completed? The plan may also require the NGOs to become more competitive for funding sources. With the rise in the number of NGOs, the field for funding is more competitive for each mission. This may create greater competion as more agencies try to get into the field. While this may create an organizational atmosphere while in theater, it may also create a "dog eat dog" situation for those attempting to gain access and resources to accomplish their particular mission.

PDD 56 is a beaurocratic document requiring step by step participation for all agencies concerned. For PDD 56 to function with the NGOs requires a give and take relationship from both the NGOs and the military. By nature, NGOs are not structured, but in PPD 56 they would be requested, if not strongly urged, to participate and assign a representative to assist in proper policy development. "The deputies committee of the various agencies i.e., government al organizations [sic] GOs, NGOs, would supervise the day to day management of the U.S. participation in complex contingency operations. This executive committee would be composed of representation from all agencies that participate in the operation." 16

This paper recommends that representatives of NGOs involved in the operation would ensure the proper allocation of resources to all agencies involved. This would not be limited to one or two NGOs, but would include a representative of all major agencies (i.e., food, medical, rebuilding, and advocacy) that were involved in the mission. The committee comprised out of PDD 56 could be a bit unwieldy, but with proper leadership on the part of the agencies, both GOs and NGOs it could give proper representation and resourcing to all agencies involved.

PDD 56 calls for a political-military plan (Pol-Mil) as a tool used for proper integration with the military and civilian authorities. As it stands, it is a tool used for the integration of GOs but could be altered to include NGOs. The Pol-Mil plan will "identify the primary preparatory issues and the tasks for conducting an operation. It will address major functional tasks, i.e., political support, humanitarian assistance and basic public service." This would be ideal for the inclusion of NGOs. The NGOs would be included and integrated on the grass roots level having input into the operational and aid in the main

thrust of the Pol-Mil plan. "The Pol-Mil plan basis [sic] is centralized planning with decentralized execution. Creating as cache of professionals familiar with the integrated planning process planning process will inspire the government's ability to manage future operations." 18

PDD 56 also requires that the governments review their operations, budget, personnel, and training to insure that there is operational growth and knowledge gained from the operations. This could include the NGOs framework. Such a plan would not be imposing a military/government structure on the NGOs, but would assist the military in working within the military/government framework on a level where both understand the mission. As in the past, the military would provide the infrastructure. This infrastructure allows the NGO to do its job. NGOs would also have part in the planning and developing the base for future work. "Coordination is needed for NGOs and GOs to follow. The coordination must be flexible. It should focus on the needs of what has to be done. "A strategic Pol-Mil plan provides the agency, and field operators with a flexible, versatile framework within which operational planning is accomplished." 19

Although the planning/framework of PDD 56 is quite useful, it may at times be too comprehensive and unruly to apply. Ultimately, it should be tailored to the situation, but this has to be done carefully with respect to the structure of both the military and the NGOs. In a government-NGO relationship the key has to be flexibility. If flexibility is key to a working relationship with NGOs, then there has to be an option, or mechanism, that allows for this flexibility. This plan or mechanism would have to be something that has a basic structure, but still allows the NGOs to work at their own pace and in their own way. The best mechanism for this may be the Civil Military Operation Center.

CIVIL MILITARY OPERATION CENTER

Within the theater of operation one of the focal points of GOs-Military-NGOs interface should be the Civil Military Operating Center (CMOC). The CMOC is a coordination center for "anticipating, facilitating, coordinating and orchestrating civil military functions and activities pertaining to the civilian population in areas where the military government organizations (GOs) and NGOs are employed."²⁰ The sole purpose of the CMOC is to provide access for the non-military agencies seeking help and coordination with the military. As always the military must also receive help from the agencies in the field. This dialogue is best served by the CMOC. The information must flow both ways. The CMOC is the liaison between the Civil Military Officer (CMO) in the theater and the NGOs. The CMO will validate the Requests For Assistance (RFA) as a true need for the successful accomplishment of the mission. The CMO will then route the RFA to the unit operations/plans section (G3, S3) where a decision is made to the feasibility of the assistance being requested. If the request is approved, the G3 will issue an order, a FRAGO, to a unit directing them to supply what is needed to the GOs/NGOs in the field. The response, either positive or negative is passed up through the system to the requesting agency. "The CMOC is the clearing house for the information exchange in the theater."²¹ In the same way the NGOs and GOs must pass any information that it feels is pertinent to the mission. Integration of information on all levels is important to the successful completion of any complex contingency operation.

A problem that seems to arise in the CMOC is the difference in language and terminology. "While English is the common language of the international operators (agencies) specialized terminology and anacronyms inhibit communications." The military uses abbreviations and acronyms and the CMOC must be able to translate them for the GOs/NGOs.

MILITARY CHAPLAIN PARTICIPATION WITH NGOS

In many Humanitarian Assistance Operations the military chaplain has played a great role in the care of the soldiers that are deployed to the theater of operation. These religious professionals have been restricted to caring only for the soldiers and not for indigenous personnel. "The role of the chaplain has been confined by mandate to ministering only to the troop, with no role to the external community." For many years this has been the norm of conduct for deployed chaplains. This author was a witness to a legal discussion regarding ministry to hurricane victims while deployed to Operation Hurricane Andrew in 1992. This policy of ministering only to troops is only now beginning to change. "The number of ad hoc and limited efforts by chaplain has reached a critical mass whereby the chaplains as a body now wish to change their mandate to work with NGOs, local religious leaders and their communities in ways that can lead to achieving a sustainable peace." 24

On 2 December 1999 the Armed Forces Chaplain Board (AFCB) met at Fort Leslie McNair, Washington DC to discuss the intervention of military chaplains in conflict resolution. This meeting included the chiefs and deputy chiefs of chaplains for the American military, along with several US Government officials to include Ambassador Robert Seiple of the State Department and Dr. James Schear, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Affairs. Ambassador Seiple stated that the way to peace in the 21st century is through reconciliation. "Nothing is attainable unless we learn the methodologies of reconciliation." Reconciliation is to "re-establish a friendship, or to settle or resolve a dispute." It is obvious that given the nature of their profession, chaplains would be key players in achieving reconciliation. The Army Chief of Chaplains, CH (MG) Gaylord T. Gunhus, stated that the chaplain can play this role, but it is something that cannot be started at the grass roots level, but must come from higher authority. Chaplain Gunhus stated the "chaplain must be a leader in this, but the decision is made at the Department of State level." This mandate is something that is paramount for the effective participation of the military chaplain and the NGOs in reconciliation. To achieve reconciliation there must first be a strong relationship with the community. Without this relationship little can be accomplished.

The lesson is that chaplains without a clear mandate and having only short-term objectives fail to achieve the first necessary step of establishing relationships. There are [sic] three major constraints to effective work in reconciliation: 1) a policy which limits the military mission, 2) funding for NGOs to contribute effectively, 3) no strategic approach developed as guidance, which would include security for civilians, civil society strengthening, and a participative strategy planning process. ²⁸

RELIGIOUS BASED NGOs

To this point this paper has described how the military works with the NGOs and how the military structure accommodates the NGO. The NGOs and military work for a common purpose, but as has been discussed, in a totally different framework. The two religiously based NGOs, World Vision International and Catholic Relief Services, serve to illustrate the complexities alluded to in this paper.

WORLD VISION INTERNATIONAL

World Vision International (WVI) is a large religiously grounded NGO with an operating budget of over \$140 million annually. Dr. Dayton Maxwell believes that NGOs must rely on, and work with, the military in complex contingency and emergency humanitarian operations, but in the <u>Operating Policy for Cooperating with Peace Keepers and the Military</u> issued in August 1999 WVI has some well though out stipulations.

The WVI policy gives very specific guidance to actors involved in humanitarian operations. This policy was developed due to the very diverse roles that are played both by the military and the NGOs in peace keeping and humanitarian operations. "The NGO community, traditionally unwilling to be associated with the military, finds itself working side by side with peacekeeping forces and peace builders in a variety of ways." In some geographical areas and in many operations the military forces have not been peacekeepers, but have jeopardized the peace and hindered the work of humanitarian NGOs. The WVI charter states that "World Vision will support the UN Declaration on Human Rights and the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child."

WVI admits that there are circumstances where it may cooperate with the military, but not all situations merit their cooperation with the military force. In a non-complex humanitarian emergency, or a disaster setting, "WVI engages in and supports military efforts to develop peace keeping strategy and skills that will aid the civilian populace." In complex humanitarian emergencies where there is not a threat of looting and unrest, there is no need of a military force; WVI would rather perform their mission without military intervention.

World Vision International is committed to working for reconciliation between all warring parties. WVI is a highly independent organization that is well equipped to handle humanitarian operation, however in certain situations when it is best for the indigenous people of the region will work along with the military in completion of the mission. "WVI may decide to cooperate with as deliberate bias towards reconciliation and a creation of a sustainable post conflict conditions." In a disaster relief setting "WVI will cooperate with the military in restoring infrastructure and delivery of relief supplies when a capability and vulnerability analysis indicates that this is beyond the capacity of the local population." Essentially WVI is stating that they will work with the military when all else fails. The military, although not trained for this mission, can act as reconcilers for the indigenous people. If the military presence were viewed as aiding the communities to build for the future, then WVI would welcome their participation.

As a humanitarian NGO, WVI is active in ensuring that all people are afforded protection. Many times military forces are the agents of corrupt governments, and are the cause of unrest and inhumane acts. It is in these situations that WVI resists in working with the military and will call them to task. "Every effort will be made to bring pressure on the military forces to respect the UN Declaration on Human Rights and the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child in all interactions with civilians and to accord them all protection due them by the Geneva Conventions." 34

Although independent of the military, WVI sees itself as a player with the military in complex humanitarian operations. They both must work together to accomplish the mission. "WVI will cooperate with those militaries of those states that have traditions of primarily humanitarian motivation in the developing world."

CATHOLIC RELIEF SERVICES

Catholic Relief Services (CRS) is a large Roman Catholic NGO that is based out of Baltimore MD. CRS has been involved in religious missions for over 50 years, serving in over 68 countries. CRS is the largest NGO working in humanitarian relief. Roman Catholic Bishop Edwin B. Broderick was the Director of CRS from 1976 to 1982. In that time period he said that "CRS was rather independent of the military in most theaters and that it received most of its funding for food stuffs and material for humanitarian aid from private sources."

NGOs and other private organizations no longer rely heavily on private sources, but attain a great deal of their materials from the government. "Though the US government channels a lot of its humanitarian aid through CRS, its independent funding from private donations is critical; it enables the agency to hang in there long after the crisis of the moment is no longer capturing headlines." Bishop Broderick said that during his tenure that the military was not involved in relief work and that he felt that there could be a reluctance to participate on the part of NGOs if they were. "Even today some of the leaders of NGOs have told me that many of the new recruits are conservative and pacifists. They probably would not sign up with a NGO knowing that the USM [sic] United States Military is part of this package." Obviously, the new members of NGOs have the perception that the military is taking over the show.

In the past the only participation that the US government had with CRS is that they helped in the transportation of foodstuffs and medical supplies. Bishop Broderick stated that this was done because it was cheaper to transport the food for CRS than it was to duplicate the effort and send over soldiers to distribute the food. "The government and the military treated CRS generously in giving grants to help in food supplies, ocean freight and airlift to handle the mission." ³⁹

The military did play a role in relief, although not always the best role, while Bishop Broderick was Director of CRS. In Haiti the native military force raided a CRS warehouse, cleaned it out, and sold the bags of flour on the street for \$100. This allowed only the rich to purchase the flour intended for the poor.

Although the Catholic Church funds CRS, it does not draw denominational lines when serving the people in the theaters of operation. It serves a wide area with mission ministry in Eastern Europe, Latin

America and Africa. In Operation Hurricane Mitch, the Caribbean and Latin American Programs department of CRS was one of the first NGOs to respond. They were in the theater long before the deployment of the first military forces. CRS is a very fiscally efficient organization, and has been providing services for the people Kosovo since 1992. Bishop Broderick relates that the annual collection from the American Catholic Churches amounts to \$10 million, while the development department of CRS raised nearly \$5 million annually. Only 5% are spent on administration, while 95% goes to feeding the poor.

The organization is so efficient, [sic] 94 cents of every dollar goes to someone in need. CRS has been in Kosovo and throughout the rest of the former Yugoslavia, since 1992, and was back in and running within 10 days of the June 10 cease-fire. 40

The military forces enter the theater, perform the mission, and then quickly depart. NGOs, especially CRS, stay around the theater for years to come. "CRS aims to stay around for at least the next five years, and plans for program expansion expansion-youth programs, women's education, etc.- are currently underway."

In his interview Bishop Broderick sees that things have certainly changed regarding relations with the military and the NGOs. "Today I would support with caution that the CMOC is an acceptable gathering place for NGOs." Bishop Broderick sees a working relationship, although cautions that the NGOs would not want to lose their autonomy to the military. He sees a great advantage in the military and the NGOs sharing assets (i.e., medical, forklifts, trucks, and bulldozers). Bishop Broderick says that in this role the military would be exercising "peaceful soldiery." One thing that Bishop Broderick mentioned that echoed the view of World Vision International is that the NGOs would also be able to watch the local military for any human rights violation and report these violations to the proper UN authority.

CONCLUSION

The Military and GOs/NGOs frequently work towards accomplishing the same mission, but in very different ways. There are inherent problems with the relationship. The greatest of these is trust between the religious NGOs and the military. One solution would be to have the CAO and a chaplain both assigned to the CMOC. This would assure the NGOs of getting proper representation for the mission. In a theater, the military is a structured, often short termed, goal oriented organization trying to work with NGOs, often times a non-structured long term goal oriented organization. The military must move into theater and rapidly stabilize the environment with logistics and physical security. The NGOs are normally in the theater before the military and have already assessed the situation. Both the military and NGOs have their own objectives and goals. The majority of workers in NGOs are highly qualified, experts, and have a great deal of experience in the particular geographical mission area. In fact "most NGO workers have more field experience than many company grade officers or even some NGOs." Both the NGO's personnel and military personnel are professional with a strong moral imperative, professionalism and a respect for life. In the interviews reflected in this paper the word "reconciliation" was key. CRS, WVI and

the religious and government leaders involved in humanitarian operations that met with the AFCB all agreed that in order for trust to be established with the people, all agencies, government, non-government and military must work for reconciliation of the warring factions. If healing does not come from within, then there is little that can be accomplished. Millions of dollars and thousands of man-hours can be spend, but without reconciliation the work can go on for years without a positive outcome. A prime example of this failure of both diplomacy and of NGOs is Somalia. The military and the NGOs entered Somalia with the goal of feeding the hungry and alleviating the suffering of the people. Two years after the start of Operation Restore Hope the military withdrew with the warlords still in place and the suffering of the people continued. The question arises as to what was accomplished except for a brief hiatus in the crisis. There was no conclusion, no healing of the warring factors, and unfortunately little was accomplished.

In the ongoing mission in Bosnia there is some easing of the suffering because all actors involved are attempting to heal the divisions of the people. The number one enemy in many "man made" humanitarian operations, that is those that are not natural disasters, is hatred between two religious sects or ethnic groups. If there is reconciliation and healing there is hope for the success of the operation. On 22 February 2000 the leaders of many NGOs /IOs will gather at EUCOM headquarters in Stuttgart Germany to discuss the role that religion, and military chaplains can play in the task of healing strife between warring nations. As humanitarian operations are seen as a major role that the American military will play in the new millennium, it is this author's opinion that the role of the military chaplain in humanitarian operations must be redefined to work closely with the NGOs as both a liaison, and a member of the team that promotes healing and reconciliation.

Despite the widespread assumption that the military and NGOs/GOs have a different goal, acknowledging their commonality will lead to a freer flow of information and camaraderie. Informal bonds forged through professional or social contact will strengthen the joint concern for mission accomplishment.

Word Count: 6793

ENDNOTES

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- ³ Steven A. Banks, <u>Planning For Future Humanitarian Assistance Operations: Using The SAO To Establish the NGO Working Relationship.</u> (Naval War College Newport RI 5 February 1999), 5
- ⁴ William J. Clinton, <u>A National Security Strategy For The New Century.</u> (Washington D.C.: The White House October 1998), 20
- ⁵ Francis Kofi Abiew and Tom Keating, "NGOs and UN Peacekeeping Operations: Strange Bedfellows" International Peacekeeping. (Vol. 6 Number 2 Summer 1999), 93
 - ⁶ IBID. 94
- ⁷ Mr. Jerrod Hoffman, Director of Caribbean and Latin American Programs, Catholic Relief Services. Interviewed by author 20 December 1999, Baltimore MD.
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³⁸ Broderick.
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- ⁴¹ IBID, 13
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- ⁴⁴ Smith, Hofstetter, 102

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